In November 1995, sitting in my office, I read the news in a trade publication: the European Union had imposed definitive anti-dumping duties on Korean electronics. Microwaves were the first target, but the entire industry understood it was only a matter of time before TVs were next.
I was a third-year salesman at KEC Group's TV Division, responsible for the European market. The tariff rates imposed on Korean TV makers varied wildly by company — Ilshin Electronics 24.4%, LG Electronics 18.8%, Daewoo Electronics 17.8%, Samsung Electronics 3.3%. Even Samsung's lowest rate was abnormal for normal trade; 24% was effectively a notice to leave the market. More importantly, 14-inch and larger TVs were essentially blocked from EU export. Only 10-inch and smaller survived.
1995 was the year the World Trade Organization (WTO) was founded. That same year, Korea ranked behind only China and India in the number of EU anti-dumping cases filed against it. Microwaves, car radios, DRAM, capacitors, electronic scales — each fell in turn. That TVs would follow was obvious to everyone.
What the Conglomerates Did, and Where Mid-Market Stood
The conglomerates' answer was predictable — local EU production. Samsung, LG, and Daewoo had the capital and headcount to build factories inside Europe and circumvent the tariffs through "Made in EU" status. But for a mid-market company like KEC, establishing an EU production facility was unrealistic — neither the capital nor the timeline made sense. During that period, many Korean mid-market TV makers effectively withdrew from the EU. Withdrawal looked like the most rational choice.
It was then that I anchored on two facts.
First, the under-10-inch mobile TV segment was small but alive. And Roadstar of Switzerland — a customer KEC had been trading with since the early 1990s — happened to have a pan-European distribution network specifically for sub-10-inch mobile TVs. There was no time to develop new markets in a crisis. Survival meant placing our products onto the working distribution channel of an already-trusted partner. We had not lost the whole market — one small live point remained. We decided to concentrate all resources there.
Second, KEC was already operating a factory in the Philippines. It had been built as a cost base to escape Korean wage levels. From that fact, one thing came into focus: anti-dumping duties are imposed on "Korean origin." Products made in the Philippines are "Philippine origin." If price competitiveness could be secured, 14-inch and larger TVs could re-enter the EU through that origin.
The German-Language Letter from Czechoslovakia
With these two ideas connected in my head, the decisive moment came. A TV assembly factory in the Czech Republic called KRTS sent us — in German — a letter of intent to purchase SKD TVs. SKD (Semi-Knocked Down) means exporting in semi-assembled form for final assembly at destination. That single letter became the trigger that moved the hypothesis into execution.
From that point on, the structure went live: 14-inch and larger TVs manufactured at our Philippines factory, exported in SKD form to EU markets — what would later be called the Korea–Philippines–EU triangle trade. Critical components and engineering flowed from Korea, assembly and country-of-origin happened in the Philippines, sales materialized in the EU. A two-track system stabilized: sub-10-inch mobile TVs exported directly from Korea, 14-inch and larger routed via Philippines SKD.
1998 — The Tide Turned in Our Favor
Just as the structure stabilized, another current ran in our favor. The 1997–98 IMF crisis drove the Korean won to 1,900 per US dollar. Whether the products were Korean or Philippine origin, our price competitiveness exploded. The result: a single $1 million letter of credit from MEI Europa Lda. in Portugal. In a market everyone had pronounced dead, we recovered revenue and grew it.
The EMEA + CIS market I managed at KEC's TV Division stabilized at roughly $50 million annually for years afterward. After the 2002 spin-off into KTV Global Corporation, the same trajectory continued.
For Today's SMEs — Thirty Years Later
Today, Korean SMEs face the same shape of shock all over again. The US–China tariff war, EU CBAM, Trump tariffs, non-tariff barriers everywhere — markets are being politically closed once more. What I return to in those moments are the two lessons of 1995.
First, a blocked market is not the end of the business. Separate the blocked part from the part still alive, and there will always be a small live point — however small. Concentrate your resources there. The ambition to recover the entire market often causes you to miss the one segment that is still viable.
Second, price competitiveness creates a path, every time. Tariffs, certifications, exchange rates — all reduce eventually to final consumer price. Redesign the structure that produces your price — your production base, your country-of-origin, your trade architecture — and a blocked market opens again. Sales is not simply "trying harder to sell." It is redrawing the structure of the business.
Today I work in ICT with the same conviction. Even when every path looks blocked, untangling the threads one by one always reveals a way through. It was true for Korean TV in 1995. It was true when we built $10 million in security product sales across 27 EU countries in 2008. It is true for ICT today.
There is always a way. It is just not in the place where you are looking.